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Extraterritorial Jurisdiction-
Environmental Muscle for the North
American Free Trade Agreement
By Richard Vaznaugh*
FOREWORD
As this Note drew close to publication, the United States Con-
gress passed the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).
The NAFTA draft, amended by last minute presidential dealmaking
and supplemented by side agreements on labor and the environment,
was approved by the House on November 17, 1993, virtually assuring
that the agreement will go into force on January 1, 1994.1
Although NAFTA includes an important side agreement on the
environment,2 neither of this Note's two focuses are relegated to his-
torical interest. First, NAFTA's potentially dire environmental effect,
developed in the first Part of this Note, remains the problem which
the environmental side agreement is intended to remedy. Whether
the side agreement is up to the task will only be shown by experience.3
* Member of the Class of 1994, B.A. University of California, 19S9. While writing
this note the author conducted research in Mexico City and in Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua,
the largest of the Mexican border cities and a major center for foreign investment.
1. See Marc Sandalow, House Approves NAFTA, SAN FRANcisco CHRONIC.L, Nov.
18, 1993, at Al; Carolyn Lochhead, Special Deals Helped Clinton Win on NAFTA, S.4
FRANcisco CHRomcLE, Nov. 18, 1993, at Al.
2. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Sept. 13,1993, (U.S.-
Can.-Mex.) available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, Extra File [hereinafter Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation].
3. The Agreement on Environmental Cooperation creates a border environmental
commission and provides for spending up to $8 billion to clean up environmental defects
along the border. NAFrA HIGHLGHrS, SAN FRN cisco CHRONICL., Nov. 18, 1993, at
A15. Additionally, the Agreement creates a special office in Canada to ensure that each of
the three countries enforces their environmental regulations. I& Penalties for non-en-
forcement can be assessed at up to $20 million against a party in the first year of the
Agreement. Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 2, annex 34. Subse-
quently, penalties are limited to .007 percent of the total trade in goods during the most
recent year measurable. Id
These measures will certainly ease the strain on the border environment, particularly
insomuch as funding is available for direct cleanups. On the other hand, it is questionable
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The second Part of this Note analyzes extraterritorial environmental
regulation and offers it as a highly effective yet controversial solution
to Mexico's poor environmental regulatory structure. Since extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction is applied unilaterally, the passage of NAFTA does
not change its validity whatsoever. Indeed, the developing free trede
zone may create the type of urgent environmental problem which
would justify extraterritorial regulation. For example, extraterritorial
jurisdiction could solve continued drastic environmental deterioration
along the border or persistent Mexican inability to enforce its own
environmental regulation.
If the problems documented in this Note persist, stronger
medicine than the Agreement on Environmental Cooperation will be
in order. In that light, extraterritorial jurisdiction remains a solution
to the regulatory imbalance between the United States and Mexico.
Finally, because this Note was in the final production stages at the
passage of NAFTA, analysis generally does not address the Agree-
ment on Environmental Cooperation described above. Furthermore,
please accept our apologies if parts of the Note treat NAFTA
prospectively.
I. INTRODUCTION
NAFTA is alternately hailed as the economic panacea of Mexico
and criticized as its environmental doom. Never before have trade
and investment barriers between countries of such disparate levels of
industrial development, infrastructure, and regulatory control been so
radically struck down.4 While the potential for tremendous expansion
in industry and trade makes the agreement seem like a map to fabled
cities of gold, Mexico's lack of regulatory enforcement in areas such as
whether fines that are capped at negligible levels will be sufficient to check the environ-
mental negligence of companies operating in Mexico.
4. Phillip E. Koehnke, Comment, North American Free Trade: Mexico, Canada and
The United States, 12 CmcANo LATiNO L. REv. 67, 69 (1992). A representative of a Cana-
dian opposition party asserts that NAFTA is Canada's first major trade agreement with a
country with environmental protection "'substantially less strict' than its own." North
American Free Trade Agreement Greeted With Suspicion by Environmental Groups, BNA
IN'L TRADE DAILY, Sept. 10, 1992.
During the integration of the European Economic Community and during the integra-
tion of East and West Germany, wealthier countries contributed to harmonizing social con-
ditions such as environmental controls and health and safety standards. However, the
differences between the U.S. and Mexico are so great-U.S. per capita income is more
than ten times higher than in Mexico-that the cost of harmonization is prohibitive. Sym-
posium, Options for a Hemispheric Trade Order, 22 U. MIAxi INTER-Ah. L. REv. 261,287
(1991).
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labor rights and environmental protection means that the path may
ultimately lead to a barren desert.
Aside from the Agreement on Environmental Cooperation,
NAFTA contains no specific environmental regulations, though it ex-
pressly incorporates existing international environmental agree-
ments.5 Under this pre-existing regulatory structure, the environment
along the Mexican-U.S. border has been seriously degraded.6 In-
creases in cross-border commerce and direct investment in Mexico
may generate more pollution 7 in an already polluted country.
NAFrA, as it now stands, would increase demands upon the Mexican
border environment in particular by increasing industry, bolstering
supporting sectors like transportation and warehousing, and attracting
workers from other parts of Mexico.8
The intended protector of Mexico's environment is the still nas-
cent and largely ineffective environmental ministry, the Secretaria de
Desarrollo Urbano y Ecologfa (SEDUE) [Mexican Ministry for Ur-
ban Development and Ecology]. 9 Mexico's comprehensive environ-
mental legislation was only passed in 1987, and it has suffered from
5. Canada-Mexico-United states: Free Trade Agreement, 31 LL.M. 289 (1993) [here-
inafter NAFTA]; see supra note 1.
6. Aside from the Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, NAFTA keeps envi-
ronmental regulations of U.S. firms almost exactly as they have been for at least the past
six years. Ley General del Equillbrio Ecol6gico y la Protecci6n al Ambiente [General Law
on Environmental Protection], (6th ed. 1992) [hereinafter General Law].
Over the last twenty years, the rapid growth of factories owned by foreign corpora-
tions has been accompanied by "drastic increases in environmental and public health
problems." Environmental Aspects of the North American Free Trade Agreement: Hearings
on the NAFTA Before the Subcomm. on Regulation, Business OpportuniV and Energy of
the House Comm. on Small Business, 102nd Cong., 94 (1991) [hereinafter House Hearings]
(testimony of Mary E. Kelly, Executive Director, Texas Center for Policy Studies).
Under NAFTA, new industry will not be allowed to locate in Mexico's three largest
cities where pollution has reached critical levels. North American Free Trade Agreement
Greeted With Suspicion by Environmental Groups, supra note 4.
7. Cf NAFTA. California Officials, Experts Say Accord Raises Questions, BNA L%'rL
TRAD DAmy, Aug. 25,1992.
8. Michael S. Feeley & Elizabeth Knier, Environmental Considerations of the Emerg-
ing United States-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, 2 Du:E J. COMP. & INT'L L. 259, 272
(1992).
9. See infra notes 53-89 and accompanying text on Mexico's enironmental regime.
But see House Hearings, supra note 6 (testimony of Robert A. Reinstein, Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary of State for Environment, Health and Natural Resources) and NAFTA: Cal-
ifornia Officials, Exports Say Accord Raises Questions, supra note 7, in ,hich NAFTA
proponents claim that Mexican environmental enforcement has improved dramatically
over the last few years.
1993]
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lack of funds10 and experience, as well as the harder-to-verify factors
of corruption and lack of political will to enforce the laws.11
The goal of this Note is to describe the environmental problems
along the Mexican-U.S. border and within Mexico. It will demon-
strate that environmental controls are lacking and that NAFTA pro-
vides little hope of improvement in the future. This Note will propose
the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction by U.S. courts over envi-
ronmental claims arising in Mexico as a means to assure environmen-
tal control over the new commerce that NAFTA will generate.
H. BACKGROUND-DOES NAFTA PROTECT THE
ENVIRONMENT?
A. Treaty Objectives
1. Economic Growth Through National Treatment
The primary goal of NAFTA is to phase out barriers to trade in
most goods and services within fifteen years.12 In terms of direct in-
vestment, NAF'A requires national treatment, that is, each nation, or
region within a nation, must treat investors from the other signing na-
tions no less favorably, in like circumstances, than it would treat na-
tional investors. 3 The Agreement will create a massive consumer
market of 360 million people and over $6 trillion in annual output
equally accessible to firms from all three countries.14
2. Sustainable Development
According to NAFTA's preamble, the governments have re-
solved to "[p]romote sustainable development [and] strengthen the
development and enforcement of environmental laws and regula-
tions."15 The goal of sustainable development is to balance the needs
of industry with the needs of the environment in such a way that eco-
nomic usefulness is perpetually assured and thus maximized in the
10. Mexico's environmental funding was limited to approximately $40 million in 1991.
North American Free Trade Agreement Greeted With Suspicion by Environmental Groups,
supra note 4.
11. Jorge Gonzdlez Torres, leader of Mexico's Green Party, claims that government
does not have the political will to stop pollution. Id.
12. President George Bush, North American Free Tade Agreement, Aug. 12, 1992,
available in Westlaw, NAFTA File.
13. NAFTA, supra note 5, ch. 11, § A, art. 1102(1)-(4), 31 I.L.M. at 639.
14. President Bush, supra note 12.
15. NAFTA, supra note 5, pmbl., 31 I.L.M. at 297.
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long term.16 That is, environmental harm should be regulated in the
interest of preserving the value of a finite natural resource, a healthy
environment.17
But NAFTA has no provisions to regulate, arbitrate, monitor, or
otherwise compel efforts to reach sustainable development. NAFTA
does not even have teeth to maintain the status quo. Although
NAFTA proclaims the impropriety of relaxing environmental stan-
dards to encourage investment, the only recourse when a party relaxes
its rules is to request a non-binding consultation with that party.18
NAFTA also expressly incorporates various international emi-
ronmental agreements, including the Agreement Between the U.S.
and Mexico On Cooperation For the Protection and Improvement of
the Environment in the Border Area (La Paz Agreement) 19 and mul-
tilateral treaties.20 Unfortunately, those agreements also fail to pro-
vide reliable deterrence to polluting firms operating in Mexico.2'
B. National Interests
Mexico needs the economic stimulation the agreement can pro-
vide.22 It is still very much of a developing nation.P Mexico hopes
that free trade will allow it to boost its low average standard of liv-
16. See Note, 30 NAT. Rnsoutcns J. 969 (1990).
17. Id.
18. NAFrA, supra note 5, ch. 11, § A, art. 1114(2), 31 .. M. at 642.
19. Agreement to Cooperate in the Solution of Environment Problems in the Border
Area, Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., 22 LL.M. 1025.
20. NAFTA, supra note 5, ch. 1, art. 103-104, annex 104.1, 1, 31 I.LM. at 297-9S.
21. For more on international environmental treaties, see infra notes 105 to 115 and
accompanying text.
22. Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari has alwa)s been a forceful advocte
of the pact. Now, with strong indications that the political future of Salinas and his polit-
ical party (the Partido Revolucionario Institucional or PRI) may depend on passage of
NAFA, he appears to be bending over backwards to get the agreement passed. Ratifira-
tion a Priority, Latin American Newsletters, Mar. 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Li.
brary, LAN file. Even though Mexico insisted that the Treaty would not be renegotiated,
after President Clinton's election in November 1992, Salinas offered initiatives to continue
discussions on the sensitive areas of labor, the environment, and the problem of emigration
from Mexico to the U.S. With a Stroke of the Presidential Pen-Vital and Historic Free
Trade Treaty with Mexico and Canada Wdl Clear Yet Another Barrier, L.A. TBMEs, Dec. 4,
1992, at 6.
23. For instance, 1991 per capita gross domestic product was approximately $3,450.
Country Report Mexico, EcoNosr ITmELGENc:E Ur-r (2nd quarter 1993), at 12. An-
other source says per capita annual income in Mexico is roughly $5,000. After NAFTA,
EcoNomusT, Mar. 20, 1993, at 71. In 1988, Mexican wages were lower than in countries
such as Taiwan, South Korea, Jamaica, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Brazil.
Adolfo Gily, The Mexican Regime in its Dilemma, 43 J. INT'L AFFA Rs 273, 286 (1990).
1993]
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ing,2 4 reduce its high unemployment,25 infuse new technology into its
industries,26 build a technologically trained work force,2 7 and generate
foreign income to pay off the external debt.28 Furthermore, some ar-
gue that NAFTA will give Mexico resources to cover the cost of envi-
ronmental protection.29
Like Mexico, the United States hopes for economic growth from
expanded trade.30 Proponents claim that segments of industries which
cannot competitively produce in the United States will move to Mex-
ico, but that exodus will be balanced by the substantial consumer de-
mand of a growing Mexican economy.31 Eventually, free trade will
generate two jobs in the United States for every job that moves to
Mexico, proponents claim.32 The United States and Canada may gain
significantly from the sale of sophisticated products and services to
Mexico as well as from access to Mexican labor and natural
resources.
33
President Bush hailed the plan as the first step in the economic
unification of the Western Hemisphere, "a free trade area from Ar-
gentina to Alaska."'3 President Clinton welcomed the plan as an im-
portant step towards economic integration, but called for and
negotiated a companion document protecting workers and the
environment. 35
24. Karin Lissakers, Why Clinton Is Right on NAFTA, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 1992, at
A15.
25. In 1990, Mexico had an unemployment rate between 15-18%. Feeley & Knier,
supra note 8, at 262.
26. Lissakers, supra note 24, at A15.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. House Hearings, supra note 6, at 162, 169 (testimony of Robert A. Reinstein, Dep-
uty Assistant Secretary for Environment, Health, and Natural Resources, Dept. of State);
After NAFTA, supra note 23, at 71.
30. Free trade is important to the U.S., particularly in light of Japan's economic suc-
cess and the massive market developing in the European Economic Community. How-
ever, it is informative that Mexico has much more at stake in that the Mexican economy is
dwarfed by that of the U.S. In 1991, 74.5% of Mexico's exports went to the U.S., and
70.7% of Mexican imports came from its huge northern neighbor. Country Report: Alex-
ico, supra, note 23, at 4. Those same goods represent a much smaller, but still significant,
portion of U.S. trade. In 1992, 9% of U.S. exports went to Mexico and 6.6% of U.S.
imports came from its Latin neighbor. Country Report: USA, ECONOMIST INTnLLIOENCE
UNrr (2nd quarter 1993), at 3.
31. See After NAFTA, supra note 23, at 71.
32. Id.
33. Symposium, supra note 4, at 282-83; Koehnke, supra note 4, at 87-91.
34. John M. Broder, U.S., Mexico, Canada Heads Sign Trade Pact, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
18, 1992, at D1.
35. Id; Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, supra note 2.
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C. State of the Border Environment
The scars from an absence of effective environmental controls are
evident in the border areas between the United States and Mexico.
The border area is the home of approximately 2,000 foreign-owned
factories, known as maquiladoras.36 In this same region of industrial
and population growth, researchers have reported a high incident of
cholera, tuberculosis,3 7 and anenchephalities-babies born with seri-
ous brain damage 38 Although researchers deny the birth defects are
connected to abandoned industrial waste dumps along the border,
they have yet to determine the cause of the defects 3 9 Studies have
shown that of the approximately fifty reported cases of anencephaly,
most of the mothers lived within two miles of the Rio Grande.4
U.S. companies are dumping toxic chemicals in Mexico just a few
hundred yards from the U.S. border.41 Zylene, a deadly toxic linked
to brain defects like anencephaly, was found behind a General Motors
plant in Matamoros, Mexico at 6,000 times above allowable levels in
the United States.42 At the Stepan Company, an American chemical
company also located in Matamoros, zylene tested at 62,000 times
above the U.S. limit.43
Video tapes obtained by ABC show Stepan Company workers
dumping chemicals into the company's backyard. 4 Reporters found
high levels of zylene, petroleum, and mercury in the dirt and open
water behind the plant.45 All these chemicals can cause brain de-
36. Primetime Live, (ABC Television Broadcast), Apr. 1, 1993, transcript available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, ABCNEW File. Maquiladoras, or in-bond firms, are foreign owned
firms which produce exclusively for export and thus receive favorable duty treatment.
Since most of the raw goods are imported from the U.S., duties are imposed only on the
value added in Mexico when they are returned. Cheryl Schecter & David Brill, Jr., Maqui.
ladoras: Will the Program Continue, 23 ST. MARY's L. 697, 698 (1992).
37. Victoria McNamara, Maquiladoras Breed Dises4 Expert Says, HousTon. PosT,
Dec. 10, 1992, at D2.
38. Gaynell Terrell, Rio Grande Focus of Pollution Study, HousTo-; PosT, Nov. 11,
1992, at Al.
39. Christine Tierney, Children's Dangerous Lead Levels Raise Mexican Worry. The
Concern is Not Just About Individual Cases, PHLADELPuA INQuiRER, Nov. 26, 1992, at
K5.
40. Primetime Live, supra note 36. The average number of anencephaly cases in the
U.S. is three per 10,000 births. Id. In Matamoras, Mexico, thirty-one cases of anencephaly
appeared within one and one-half years-the largest cluster known. Id. Fifty cases ap-
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fects.4 6 At the maquiladora next door to Stepan, high levels of ben-
zene were found in a small pond.47 Benzene is known to cause
leukemia.4 Everyday, almost 100 million gallons of toxic waste enter
the Rio Grande from Mexican cities and towns along the river; none
of these cities and towns has a modem waste treatment facility.
49
Abandoned toxic waste dumps dot the river area and more are
planned to accommodate the area's growing industries.50
The burgeoning population has also increased the level of pollu-
tion in the Rio Grande.51 Following its course along the U.S.-Mexico
border, the Rio Grande picks up pollution and sewage as it flows to-
wards the Gulf of Mexico. By the time it flows through downtown
Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, the fecal contamination level is 1,000
times greater than the Texas limit.
52
D. Mexican Environmental Regulation Under NAFTA
Other than the side agreement, NAFTA does not change current
environmental regulation. A description of environmental regulation
under NAFTA is essentially a description of current environmental
regulation in Mexico.
1. The Mexican Environmental Regime
Although Mexico has solid environmental laws, "Mexico's com-
mitment to enforcement of environmental regulations remains ques-
tionable."53 On paper, Mexico's General Law is considered to be
among the best environmental regulations in the developing world.
5 4
Some commentators believe that if the Law were enforced, the system




49. Bruce Selcraig, Who Crosses the Rio Grande, The Imperiled River that Binds Mer.
ico and the U.S. Together, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 3, 1993, at Fl.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Feeley & Knier, supra note 8, at 273 (citing James Garcia, Border River Laden
With Wastes, AuSTN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Sept. 29, 1991, at Al). Nuevo Laredo is
approximately 200 miles upstream from the Gulf of Mexico.
53. North American Free Trade Agreement Greeted With Suspicion by Environment
Groups, supra note 4 (quoting U.S. Senator Max Baucus (D-Montana)).
54. Daniel I. Basurto Gonzalez & Elaine Flud Rodriguez, Environmental Aspects of
Maquiladora Operations: A Note of Caution For U.S. Parent Corporations, 22 ST. MARY'S
L.L 659, 665 (1991).
55. Feeley & Knier, supra note 8, at 282.
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vironmental enforcement has been lax.56 The solid environmental
laws have two failings: the inability of private parties to bring suit for
damages, and the ineffectiveness of SEDUE.
(a) Private actions
Although Mexico's General Law on Environmental Protection 3
does not allow citizen suits, a variety of environmentally related torts,
including forms of intentional torts, negligence, and strict liability, are
theoretically available to plaintiffs suing in Mexican courts.59 How-
ever, there are legal disincentives to suits. Damages are limited to
provable actual damages and lost earnings, which are generally very
low.60 Mental anguish and other intangible damages are extremely
hard to establish.61 Punitive damages are not available.62 Further-
more, class actions and contingent fee arrangements are unavailable.
63
The lack of private causes of action for Mexican environmental
plaintiffs has two grave implications."4 First, the injured party is de-
prived of compensation for actual and consequential damages. Sec-
ond, the nation is deprived of a highly effective and public tool for
enforcement of environmental policy and deterrence of illegalities.
(b) Weak administrative enforcement
Most environmental law in Mexico is enforced by administrative
agencies.65 The General Law gives SEDUE environmental responsi-
56. Marjorie Miller, Politics: With Clinton Victory, Mexicans Express Nervousness over
the Future of Pact with the United States and Canada, L.A. TLNIES, Nov. 15, 1992, at A10.
57. Evidently, administrative responsibility for the Mexican environment is being reor-
ganized. SEDUE's responsibilities are being handed to a new agency, the Secretaria de
Desarrollo Social (SEDESOL) [Ministry of Social Development], and an environmental
attorney general is being created. Interview with Leopoldo Burguete.Stanek, environmen-
tal attorney for the law firm of Bryan, Gonzalez-Vargas & Gonzalez-Baz, in Ciudad Juarez,
Chihuahua, Mexico (notes on file with author) [hereinafter Burguete-Stanek Interview].
58. General Law, supra note 6.
59. Daniel I. Basurto Gonzalez, Environmental Law of Merico, LB'zL E-.vm L ,w
AND REG. § 4.2 (1991) [hereinafter Environmental Law of Mexico] (article provided by
Bryan, Gonzalez-Vargas & Gonzalez Baz on file with author). Basurto & Flud,supra note
54, at 677. Mexico does not have a common law. All laws, including environmentally
related torts, are set out in codes. Id.
60. Basurto & Flud, supra note 54, at 672.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 671, 690.
64. No significant private action has been litigated, and none has come to trial. Cf.
Burguete-Stanek Interview, supra note 57.
65. Basurto & Flud, supra note 54, at 672.
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bility for everything from air pollution and noise pollution to the im-
port and export of hazardous wastes.
66
Administrative fines are limited to a maximum of $80,000 against
a first-time violator. 67 Though that sum may appear small to a mul-
tinational corporation, fines are bolstered by possible criminal liability
for individual managers and temporary and permanent plant
closures.68
However, enforcement is lax. For instance, comprehensive envi-
ronmental impact statements are required prior to any construction or
modification with potential damaging effects on the environment.
69
Yet, on August 11, 1992, the U.S. General Accounting Office released
findings that none of the maquiladoras it had studied had filed envi-
ronmental impact statements.70
SEDUE has the same sorry record when it comes to hazardous
waste. Maquiladoras currently dispose of hazardous waste with mini-
mal oversight and regulation by the Mexican Government.71 Although
Mexico's Decree for the Management of Toxic Residues72 and the La
Paz Agreement of 1983 (at Annex III) require that American-owned
maquiladoras send their hazardous waste back to the United States,73
there is no specific implementation plan to insure that the goal is met
and the law is largely ignored.74 According to U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and SEDUE data, in 1987, approximately
twenty of the more than 1,000 maquiladoras in Mexico had actually
shipped their waste back to the United States75
While SEDUE looks askance, the maquiladoras have contributed
to Mexico's environmental problems mainly because of the generation
66. Id. at 675. General Law, supra note 6, tit. 6.
67. Basurto & Flud, supra note 54, at 664-65, 675.
68. Id.
69. Id at n.44; Malissa Hathaway McKeith, The Environment and Free Trade: Meeting
Halfway at the Mexican Border, 10 PAc. BAS. L. 183, 190 (1991).
70. NAFTA Agreement Greeted With Suspicion by Environmental Groups, supra note
4, at 10.
71. Feeley & Knier, supra note 8, at 275-77.
72. General Law, supra note 6, ch. 4, arts. 52, 57 [Regulations for Toxic Residues].
73. Roberto A. Sanchez, Health and Environmental Risks of the Maquiladora in Mexi-
call, 30 NAT. RESOURcES J. 163, 168 (1990). Feeley & Knier, supra note 8, at 275. Like all
goods imported for use by a maquiladora, hazardous waste is required to be exported out
of Mexico. House Hearings, supra note 6, at 127.
74. Sanchez, supra note 73, at 176-178.
75. Id (Because EPA and U.S. Customs officials collect little data on the trans-
boundary movement of hazardous waste, these figures could-as maquiladora representa-
tives have claimed-underestimate the quantity of waste shipped out of Mexico).
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of hazardous waste.76 For example, in 1992, 600 used barrels pro-
duced by a maquiladora and containing residual hazardous waste were
found dumped within twenty kilometers of Juarez, Chihuahua, the
largest of the Mexican border cities.77 High levels of chemicals that
should have been returned to the United States or recycled in Mexico
have been found in the ground and water behind U.S.-owned plants.a
The formidable cost of returning the waste to the United States is
a strong incentive to circumvent Mexico's lightly enforced hazardous
waste codes.79 On rare occasions hazardous materials can be national-
ized, a procedure by which the materials are left in Mexico rather than
shipped out of the country 0 However, nationalization is not a viable
option for maquiladoras8 ' because nationalization usually requires re-
cycling or reuse. In 1990 there were only seven SEDUE authorized
recycling centers in the countryan a situation which makes recycling
very difficult for the maquiladoras. Instead, these hazardous wastes
have allegedly been dumped into sewers or sold to small operators
who then dump them indiscriminately. 3 Hazardous waste drums have
also been sold to Mexican citizens who use them for washing and
drinking 8 4
(c) Insulation of foreign firms from environmental liability
In order to avoid both citizen suits and regulatory fines, foreign
companies can minimize their liability for environmental damage by
investing very little in their Mexican subsidiaries. Thus, even if a
claim can be successfully brought in Mexico, additional litigation must
be brought to make the judgment enforceable against the parent cor-
poration.8 5 There have been no published cases asserting jurisdiction
over a foreign parent company as a defendant in a Mexican court.J
76. Id. at 170.
77. Carlos Irigoyen, Costeara AMAC Traslado de 600 Tambos Txicos-Estdn En Un
Basurero Clandestino [Ma quiladora Association Will Pay for Shipment Of 600 Toxic Waste
Drums Found In Secret Waste Dump], DLARIo DE JuAREZ, Nov. 26. 1992.
78. Primetime Live, supra note 36.
79. Sanchez, supra note 73, at 178. Returning a barrel of hazardous material for treat-
ment in the U.S can cost between $200 and $2000, whereas in Mexico it seldom costs more
than $200.
80. General Law, supra note 6, chs. 3-4, arts. 52, 57.
81. Sanchez, supra note 73, at 171.
82. Feeley & Knier, supra note 8, at 275.
83. Id. at 275-76.
84. Id.
85. Basurto & Flud, supra note 54, at 680--2.
86. Id. at 674.
1993]
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For example, under the maquiladora program, the independent
Mexican maquila corporation often owns little more than the building
in which its factory is located (sometimes, not even that). 7 Capital
goods and raw resources can be loaned or leased from a clever parent
company in such a way that any hope of winning a substantial finan-
cial award would require action against the parent company.88 The
parent is not only one step removed from the immediate operation,
but holds ownership of most of the assets at its headquarters in the
United States. 9
(d) Mexico's closed political process hinders environmental
regulation
Along with lack of funds and experience, Mexico's lax environ-
mental regulation may be due to marginalization of internal political
pressure. 90 Though NAFTA critics have attacked the Agreement on
the basis of Mexico's human rights violations alone,91 the country's
repressive system may also be vitally related to environmental regula-
tion. In Mexico, expression against government interest is discour-
aged with a heavy hand, and organized political opposition is heavily
outgunned.92 The United States must realize that internal political
87. Id. at 682-83.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. McKeith, supra note 69, at 188.
91. Eric Rosenthal, 2te NAFTA To Human Rights, STAR TRIBUNE, Mar. 31, 1993, at
A19. (Eric Rosenthal is a staff attorney for the Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights.)
92. According to Amnesty International, Mexican political and human rights activists,
lawyers, trade unionists, and others can be subject to torture or murder. Torture in Cus.
tody a Daily Fact of Life In Mexico, AGENCE FRANCE PREssE, Sept. 17, 1991, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, AFP file.
The PRI has held power for decades through a combination of electoral fraud, crony-
ism, and intimidation. Primitive Politics, ECONOMIST, Feb. 13, 1993, at 8. "The PRI re-
mains an essentially authoritarian structure, complete with its own domestic intelligence
apparatus." Mexico: Ring in the Old, EcoNoMisT, Mar. 14, 1992, at 49. One major opposi-
tion party, the Democratic Revolution Party, claims that 164 of its members have been
assassinated since 1988. Id. The PRI has been Mexico's ruling party since 1929. Id.
In recent history, the Mexican government does not have a record of responsiveness
to popular and dissenting opinion. After 1940, the Mexican Government kept workers in
step with its program of industrialization by tactics that included the substantial threat of
coercion. Robert R. Kaufman, Mexico and Latin American Authoritarianism, in AumoR-
rrARIANmsM IN MEmXco 212 (1977). While focusing on the interplay between politics and
industrial development, this essay identifies Mexico as an authoritarian and corporatist
political structure and compares it to similar systems existing in Argentina and Brazil until
recent democratization in those countries.
In 1990 Mario Vargas Llosa, novelist and unsuccessful free-market candidate for the
Peruvian presidency, spontaneously announced on Mexican television that "Mexico is the
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pressure is unlikely to affect stricter environmental regulation in
Mexico.
Needless to say, Mexico's allegedly repressive political system di-
rectly sustains the regulatory status quo when it strikes at environ-
mental scientists and citizens who complain about environmental
damage. Many Mexican environmental critics have allegedly been
hushed by firings, intimidation, and cuts in environmental research
funding.93 Examples include the closure in 1992 of Mexico City's
Center for Ecodevelopment.94 The prolific institution employed
thirty-five of Mexico's leading researchers, including Dr. Ivan
Restrepo, a well-known critic of Mexico's chemical-and-machine-in-
tensive export agriculture. Another case is that of physicist, professor
and well-known anti-nuclear activist Jesus Arias Chivez. In 1988, his
scientifically oriented public-interest institute and laboratory burned
to the ground in a fire that investigators attribute to arson. The perpe-
trators were never found. Arias was later denounced as an agitator,
and he remains unemployed except for occasional contracts with for-
eign governments.95
Another example is that of Carmen Hemdndez de Vdsquez, a
former head of the civil-protection office for the Tijuana area. While
investigating a toxic waste site owned by a U.S. firm near Tijuana, she
was warned by local officials that her investigations and public-aware-
ness campaigns were "alarming" the citizenry.96 When Hemrndez
persisted in her investigation, she was abruptly fired.97 Later, investi-
gators found environmental damage at the site that could cost up to
$20 million to clean. 8
Complaining citizens have also been allegedly harassed. For ex-
ample, a group of Mexican women recently complained to SEDUE
about the levels of chemicals in their neighborhoods.99 Rather than
helping, a SEDUE official excluded ABC reporters from a meeting
perfect dictatorship." Primitive Politics, supra. The PRI has a long history of tampering
with elections. Id. Many impartial observers believe that massive fraud was employed dur-
ig the 1988 presidential election, yet Salinas won by only a narrow margin. Id.
93. Perspective on Mexico; The Silence of the Labs, L.A. TiMsE, July 1, 1993, at B7.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. Hemdndez was fired in March 1992.
97. Id.
98. Id. The Mexican Government settled the case against the U.S. o%ner of the waste
dump for $2.5 million. Id. Some commentators argue the agreement was a bid to preempt
political use of the ecological disaster by NAFTA opponents. Id.
99. Primetime Live, supra note 36.
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where he accused the women of being foreign agents and warned that
they were all under investigation.100
Another bar to political participation is alleged widespread cen-
sorship in the Mexican press, particularly on television.10 1 Although
President Salinas has been recognized for his efforts to reform Mex-
ico's human rights record,10 in the four years that he has been presi-
dent at least twenty-eight journalists have been allegedly assassinated,
presumably by corrupt officials, businessmen, politicians, and drug
dealers. 0 3 According to the Miami-based Inter-American Press As-
sociation, journalists in rural Mexico suffer from frequent government
pressure-including kidnappings, intimidation, jailings, and threats-
to force their silence.'04
Alleged human rights abuses are not necessarily strong reasons to
avoid NAFTA. After all, the alleged abuses will not improve in the
absence of an agreement. However, if environmental protection is to
be a goal of the agreement, external pressure will likely be needed to
strengthen environmental regulation in Mexico.
2. International Regulation of the Environment
(a) Multinational environmental treaties
International environmental treaties explicitly adopted by
NAFTA to the extent that they are not inconsistent with NAFTA 05
are the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer"°e and The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Wastes and Their Disposal.: 7 Unfortunately, these groundbreaking
100. Id.
101. Mexican Society Suffers from Disinformation, Says Carlos Monsivdis, NoiMux
MExIcAN NEws SERVICE, June 26, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni file.
(Monsivais initially made this statement in El Financiero, Mexico's largest business-ori-
ented daily newspaper.)
102. Vigilantism in Mexico, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 20, 1992, at B10.
103. Id.
104. David Schrieberg, Deal Gone Bad Led to Mexican Journalist's Slaying, SACRA-
mENTO BEE, Dec. 2, 1992, at A12.
105. NAFTA, supra note 5, ch. 1, art. 104, 31 I.L.M. at 297-98. The Convention on the
International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (1973) is also adopted;
however, it is not of pressing concern to the focus of this Note.
106. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 1987,26
I.L.M. 1550 (entered into force on Jan. 1, 1989).
107. Opened for signature Mar. 22, 1989, S. reaty Doec. No. 5,102d Cong., 1st Sess., 28
I.L.M. 649 (1989). The Convention came into force on May 5, 1992, and has been ratified
by the U.S., Mexico, and many other nations. Cf. Russell H. Shearer, Comparative Analy-
sis of the Basel and Bamako Conventions on Hazardous Waste, 23 ENvTL. L. 141 (1993)
[hereinafter Basel and Bamako Conventions].
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multinational environmental treaties mandate largely self-policing
compliance.1
0 8
The Basel Convention has vague requirements and loopholes that
allow polluters to avoid compliance.1°9 For instance, hazardous
materials can fall outside the Convention's definitions of hazardous
waste." 0 Sea dumping is banned, but requirements for oversight and
governmental action are vague."' Although hazardous waste produc-
tion must be reduced "to a minimum," the Convention allows a great
deal of flexibility in determining what is a "minimum." '
The Montreal Protocol is historic in that it represents the first
global commitment to reduce pollution before actual harm is regis-
tered."3 However, the document is focused on ozone-depleting
chemicals," 4 and it allows developing nations to continue using
chlorofluorocarbons years into the future." 5 Neither the Basel Con-
vention nor the Montreal Protocol can be relied on to impose strict
environmental regulation on firms operating in Mexico, even in con-
junction with existing bilateral agreements.
(b) The bilateral Border Plan
The Bush administration hoped to shore up criticism of NAFTA's
omission of environmental provisions with a companion environmen-
tal document based largely on the La Paz Agreement'1 6 and colloqui-
ally called the "Border Plan."1 7 The Border Plan's objectives are to
study the environmental problems within 100 kilometers of the Mexi-
108. McKeith, supra note 69, at 210.
109. Alan Neff, Not In Their Backyards, Either A Proposal for a Foreign Environmen-
tal Practices Act, 17 ECOLOGY LQ. 477, 482 (1990). Generally, the Basel Convention
urges that its members reduce the quantity and potential hazard of generated wastes, place
responsibility for disposal on generators, use clean technologies and sound waste manage-
ment practices, call for eventual elimination of hazardous waste, and use other methods to
reduce the pollution caused by hazardous waste. Shearer, supra note 107, at 153.
110. Id. at 154.
111. Id. at 156-57.
112. Id. at 159, 162.
113. Joel A. Mintz, Keeping Pandora's Box Shu A Critical Assessment of the Montreal
Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer, 20 U. MtIAu INrER-AM. L RLv.
565, 566 (1989).
114. Id. at 568-69.
115. Neff, supra note 109, at 482.
116. The La Paz Agreement directs government authorities on both sides of the border
to prevent, reduce, and eliminate sources of air, water, and soil pollution within 50 kilome-
ters of the border. Feeley & Knier, supra note 8, at 283.
117. Id. at 264.
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can-U.S. border. 118 However, the plan lacks any mention of increased
funding.119 There is little practical discussion of how to resolve any
problems the plan might uncover.120 Furthermore, the plan leaves any
concrete solutions to the discretion of the EPA.121 Because the plan
lacks provisions giving regulators power to stop pollution, some critics
have called it a "plan to plan."'" The past abuses and current condi-
tions of the Mexican environment provide an ample basis to propose
an additional safeguard in NAFrA to ensure that sustainable develop-
ment and environmental control can be achieved.
111. A PROPOSAL-EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION OVER ENVIRONMENTAL
CLAIMS ARISING IN MEXICO
A. Why the United States Should Take Unilateral Action to Stop
American Companies from Polluting In Mexico.
The United States has at least four strong reasons to ensure envi-
ronmental responsibility by companies operating in Mexico.
1. Unfair Competition
When NAFrA eliminates duties, lax environmental regulations
will be a significant competitive advantage for many U.S. companies
operating in Mexico vis-a-vis their counterparts operating in the
United States"2 The lack of regulatory enforcement and realistic op-
tions for private civil actions gives those firms what amounts to an
unfair trade subsidy; they will generally bear lower costs in terms of
preventing pollution, in some cases far lower costs.
Without countervailing disadvantages, such as import duties, the
lower production costs associated with lighter regulation inevitably at-
tract business to the locale where goods are most cheaply produced.
Thus, under NAFTA, companies that produce a high amount of pollu-
tion and toxic waste will have to move to Mexico to take advantage of
comparatively lax restrictions or face constant undercutting on the
118. Id. at 267.
119. Id. at 265.
120. Id. at 266.
121. Id. at 265.
122. House Hearings, supra note 6, at 123, 126 (testimony of Jim Marston of the Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund).
123. For the purposes of this Note, the effects on Canada are assumed to be similar to
those on the United States. However, the Canadian situation will be better addressed by
one with more than the author's poor knowledge of Canada's law and economics.
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market. Goods produced in Mexico for less money and then sold for
less money in the free trade area would force many U.S. and Cana-
dian-based factories to sell below an acceptable profit margin or sell
nothing at all.
Though this Note argues that firms operating in the United States
are the victims of unfair competition, this is merely the
microeconomic effect. At the macroeconomic level, the attraction of
cheaper operations not only disadvantages specific firms, but it also
eliminates for future entrepreneurs the economic viability of U.S. op-
erations that require costly environmental controls.
2. Transfrontier Wastes-Crossing the Border From Mexico
The Bush administration's Inter-Agency Task Force to review
U.S.-Mexico Environmental Issues projected that under NAFTA, "the
number of Mexican pollutant-emitting facilities will increase, it will
prompt Mexican commercial and residential pollutant increases that
will affect the United States and will prompt concomitant increases in
United States sister cities as well." 24 Though customary law provides
that each country is responsible for its transfrontier waste, in reality,
this is hard to enforce." s
3. Moral Obligation
NAFTA, as written, will allow U.S. companies to create levels of
pollution abroad that would not be tolerated in the United States.126
In the United States, companies are generally compelled to internalize
environmental costs by funding cleaner operations, by converting tox-
ins to benign chemicals, or by paying the damages of the individuals or
institutions who have been injured.
Because of Mexico's severe economic need, there is a distinct
temptation for policy makers to sacrifice environmental protection in
pursuit of jobs and foreign investmentY' 7 Many developing countries
have already sacrificed environmental concerns in response to domes-
tic political pressure and economic need.128 For moral reasons, it is
important that the United States avoid giving Mexico the enticement
to maintain low standards to attract new investment.
124. Feeley & Knier, supra note 8, at 272.
125. Neff, supra note 109, at 480.
126. See supra Part IID.
127. Neff, supra note 109, at 485.
128. Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, 104 HARv. L. RE,.
1484, 1497.
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4. Preserving International Goodwill and Trust
A reputation for spreading wanton pollution far above what
would be tolerated in the United States damages U.S. political good-
will and may affect the treatment that U.S. companies receive when
doing business abroad. 29 These harmful environmental practices are
a threat to foreign relations not only with Mexico but also with other
countries. 3 o
B. How the United States Can Act Unilaterally-Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction.
1. A Legislative Model
Various commentators have considered the idea of legislatively
mandated extraterritorial environmental claims.1 31 Extraterritorial ju-
risdiction has also been suggested as a companion measure to
NAFTA, an assurance that U.S. interests in environmentally regulated
growth are not jeopardized by a free trade agreement.3 2
To analyze the application of extraterritorial jurisdiction in Mex-
ico, let us assume a relatively simple model: Congress passes a statute
abolishing forum non conveniens in claims for pollution-related
causes of action arising in Mexico and directed at U.S. defendants.
The legislation should provide for application of U.S. law to these law-
suits. 133 The unilateral act would be sufficient to allow adjudication of
pollution-related causes of action in U.S. courts.' 34 Such jurisdiction
could be applied consistently with international law, constitutional
129. Laurel E. Miller, Forum Non Conveniens and State Control of Foreign Plaintiff
Access to U.S. Courts in International Tort Actions, 58 U. Ci. L. REV. 1369, 1396 (1991).
"[IThe appearance of a double standard damages the United States image abroad." Id.
130. See Neff, supra note 109, at 510.
131. See, e.g., id.; Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, supra
note 128.
132. House Hearings, supra note 6, at 112 (testimony of Michael McCloskey, chairman
of the Sierra Club) (citing McKeith, The Environment and Free Trade: Meeting Halfiray at
the Mexican Border, supra note 69).
133. Congressional intent would render moot (unless constitutionally impermissible)
disputes over choice of law rules and judicial consideration of international comity. Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2910 (1993). See infra notes 185-99 and
accompanying text.
134. See generally Miller, supra note 129. Congress has the power to grant standing to
sue to foreign citizens. Neff, supra note 109, at 510-11. But Neff cautions that allowing
private plaintiffs to seek civil penalties requires careful thought. Id.
Though thorough analysis of the economic effects of such civil damages on the indus-
trial community is beyond the scope of this Note, awarding civil damages will effectively
harmonize environmental deterrents on both sides of the border with a minimum of ad-
ministrative agency interference.
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due process, and jurisdictional procedures (other than forum non
conveniens).
Congress can eliminate forum non conveniens for tort claims
alone or it can apply existing federal environmental legislation to ac-
tions of U.S. companies in Mexico. The latter measure would nearly
eliminate regulatory imbalance and the resulting unfair competition
while effectively advancing both countries' other interests. However,
application would be much more complicated due to agency involve-
ment in Mexico, data collection, and other factors.135
2. Effectiveness
Perhaps the strongest argument for applying U.S. law to U.S.
companies abroad is the effectiveness of a tried and tested regulatory
system and body of law. U.S. courts and regulations are a proven de-
terrent to environmental violations. Industrial firms are respectful of
U.S. courts, although they may not necessarily fear the Mexican judi-
ciary and administrators.U6 According to an executive from a major
chemical company, "The realization at corporate headquarters that li-
ability for any Bhopal-like disaster would be decided in the U.S.
courts, more than pressure from third world governments, has forced
companies to tighten safety procedures, upgrade plants, supervise
maintenance more closely and educate workers and communities.' 137
Extraterritorial jurisdiction indirectly addresses the problems of
unfair competition and transfrontier waste. By providing a strong de-
terrent to polluters, it should address both those problems effectively
while serving other U.S. interests.
C. The Law of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Any time a court or regulatory agency acts, it must find grounds
for its jurisdiction. Extraterritorial jurisdiction, the application of do-
mestic jurisdiction to controversies and injuries where at least some of
the facts occur abroad, is no exception.13 s Once legislative consensus
135. Application of federal environmental legislation is an important option deserving
comprehensive analysis. However, it is beyond the scope of this Note. For a general analy-
sis, see Neff, supra note 109.
136. Relaxed enforcement gives multinational corporations little incentive to minimize
pollution or guard against products liability and toxic torts. Dow Chemical Co. v. Castro
Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674, 688 (Tex. 1990).
137. Foreign Finns Feel the Impact of Bhopal Most, WALL, ST. J., Nov. 26, 1985, at C22.
138. This definition is used for convenience and to preserve the integrity of the Note.
Note that jurisdiction based on objective territoriality has been distinguished from extra-
territorial assertions of jurisdiction because the basis of jurisdiction is the foreign conducts
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is reached on the wisdom of extraterritorial jurisdiction, that jurisdic-
tion must be established in compliance with domestic and interna-
tional legal principles.
1. Forum Non Conveniens
"What is really involved is not convenience but connivance to
avoid corporate accountability. 
139
(a) Background
Suits based on extraterritorial jurisdiction frequently find their
way into U.S. courts 40 and are routinely rejected. 141 Federal judges
have disallowed claims by foreign plaintiffs for products liability and
personal injury claims on the basis of forum non conveniens.
142
The doctrine of forum non conveniens is based on the idea that a
particular forum may be unduly inconvenient to the defendant and
the court, even though jurisdiction is otherwise proper.1 43 Following
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert'44 and its progeny, federal and most state
courts consider private and public factors when they apply the doc-
trine. The private interests include ease of access to sources of proof
and witnesses, availability of compulsory process, possibility to view
the premises, enforceability of a judgment, and "all other practical
problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpen-
sive.' 145 Public factors include ease of administration, the interest in
having local controversies tried at home, 46 and "the original court's
effect within the territory of the adjudicating country. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, 731
F.2d 909, 923 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
139. Dow Chemical, 786 S.W.2d at 680 (Doggett, J., concurring).
140. Basurto & Flud, supra note 54, at 690. Title VII, antitrust laws, and the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act are among the U.S. statutes with provisions for extraterritorial
jurisdiction.
141. Miller, supra note 129, at 1369.
142. Id.
143. Basurto & Flud, supra note 54, at 69.
144. 330 U.S. 501 (1947). In Gilbert, the Court dismissed a negligence suit brought by a
Virginia resident in a New York federal district court. A fire caused by the defendant, a
Pennsylvania corporation, burned the plaintiff's warehouse in Lynchburg, Virginia. Id. at
502-03. The Court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the suit on grounds of forum non
conveniens. The Court noted that all the events had taken place in Virginia, most wit-
nesses resided there, and plaintiff had access to adjudication in Virginia state courts or in
federal courts for the area. Id. at 511.
145. Id. at 508.
146. 1& at 508-09.
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desire not to overburden taxpayers, jurors or the judicial system with
cases only tangentially related to the forum."1 47
Although the Gilbert factors do not automatically eliminate juris-
diction over claims arising in Mexico and other foreign countries, the
decision is left to individual judges who are free to balance the Gilbert
factors as they will. 48
U.S. courts generally defer to a plaintiff's choice of forum.
1 4 9
However, in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,' - the Court held that such
presumption applies with less force where the plaintiff is foreign.'51
Furthermore, Piper held that less favorable laws in a foreign country
should not justify dismissal of the motion.'- 2 Many courts have relied
on Piper to grant forum non conveniens motions.15 3 Often courts will
grant motions solely to lighten overcrowded dockets, one of the inter-
ests enunciated in Gilbert.'54
One case dismissed from federal court on the basis of forum non
conveniens was In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster.'' 5 On
the night of December 2,1984, Union Carbide's pesticide plant leaked
toxic gases that killed approximately 2,100 people and injured over
200,000 more." 6 The plant was owned by Union Carbide India Lim-
ited, a company whose majority shareholder was the New York-based
Union Carbide Incorporated.' 7 The Indian government represented
the aggrieved and brought suit in Federal District Court for New
York.
The court granted the motion because "the public interest of In-
dia in this litigation far outweighs the public interest of the United
States. This litigation offers a developing nation the opportunity to
vindicate the suffering of its own people within the framework of a
147. JACK H. FRi mErHAL & ARTHUR R M E R, SUM AND SUBSTANCt OF Civ.L
PROCEDURE § 2.7620 (4th ed. 1988).
148. Catherine A. Boehringer, Exporting or Importing Justice?, TRIAL, March 1997, at
67.
149. Basurto & Flud, supra note 54, at 691-93.
150. 454 U.S. 235 (1981). In Piper, the estates of several Scottish residents 'Aho died in
a plane crash in Scotland brought suit in United States District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania. Although the owners and operators of the plane were companies
registered in the United Kingdom, the plane had been manufactured in Pennsylvania by
the defendant, Piper Aircraft Company.
151. Id. at 255-56.
152. Id. at 247.
153. Boehringer, supra note 148, at 66.
154. Id. at 67.
155. 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
156. Basurto & Flud, supra note 54, at 693.
157. Id.
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legitimate legal system."15 Paradoxically, the Indian government it-
self chose to sue in the United States.159
Gilbert's flexible standard means that individual judges dwell on
procedural rules, complicated questions of foreign policy, economics,
and international environmental regulation on an ad hoc basis.160
Moreover, these questions are often not amenable to analysis by the
bench. They require analysis of complex, technical factors, such as the
social and environmental costs of such regulation, its likely effect on
trade and economic growth in the United States and in Mexico, and
the state of the environment in the non-forum country.
161
(b) Eliminating forum non conveniens
Mexico appears ripe for the targeted abolition of forum non con-
veniens. This move would give control over important decisions
about the reach of U.S. law to the executive and legislature, rather
than to the discretion of a common law procedural tool of overworked
judges. Decisions vital to economic policy will be predicated on eco-
nomic, scientific, and political analysis rather than on administrative
backlogs. Since the effects would be in one country, U.S. economists
and political analysts could assess all the consequences of such an ac-
tion with a fair degree of accuracy.
Also, convenience will not be an issue. Litigating outside the na-
tion where facts arise is now much more convenient than it was when
the doctrine of forum non conveniens was developed, thanks to inno-
158. In re Union Carbide, 634 F. Supp. at 865-66.
159. Miller, supra note 133, at nn.86-87. See 634 F. Supp. at 865-66. But see Develop.
ments in the Law-International Environmental Law, supra note 128, arguing that adjudi-
cating foreign born claims deprives the foreign country from advancing its legal system to
deal with new situations. For example, dismissing In re Union Carbide prompted India to
revamp its tort system to include a strict liability standard for ultra-hazardous activities.
160. Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, supra note 128, at
1619. This is not to say that consideration of international issues is completely foreclosed,
For example, In re Union Carbide briefly considered arguably international issues. In re
Union Carbide, 643 F. Supp. at 862. The court considered the danger of developing a
double standard of liability for multinational corporations, the responsibility of U.S. corpo-
rations for accidents on foreign soil, the threat of Bhopal-like disasters to U.S. standing in
the world community, and similar arguments. Id. However, the court held that in light of
India's stronger interest in resolving the suit at home, an imposition of American values on
Indian concerns would be imperialism. Id. at 867.
161. For instance, an important question is how the added cost of environmental regu-
lation will macroeconomically affect the market when prices of goods are raised to reflect
the changes. In re Union Carbide, 643 F. Supp. at 876. Forcing a U.S. company to internal-
ize costs may hand the market to a foreign competitor who does not internalize costs, thus,
in the aggregate, providing no additional environmental protection whatsoever. Id
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vations in communication systems, rapid physical transport, informa-
tion systems, and environmental monitoring.16 In the case of Mexico,
the proximity of the vast majority of U.S.-owned plants to the U.S.
border means that distance and travel will be as convenient as domes-
tic diversity cases.
Although Spanish will be required in some proceedings, the lan-
guage barrier would present itself even if such claims were adjudi-
cated in Mexico.163 Furthermore, the entire border region is steeped
in bilingualism. Spanish can be interpreted, and it is likely that many
important documents will not only be designed in accordance with the
needs of the U.S. parent company, but many will actually be in Eng-
lish. Oversight and documentation is, as of yet, minimal and thus not
likely to be a large factor.
Statutory elimination of forum non conveniens is not unprece-
dented. In Dow Chemical Co. v. Alfaro, the Texas Supreme Court
held that a statute preempted the doctrine of forum non conveniens in
cases litigating specific state causes of action and ruled that a class of
Costa Rican employees of the Standard Fruit Company could sue the
Dow Chemical Co. and co-defendants for supplying Standard's Costa
Rican plantations with a pesticide that rendered its users sterile.164
U.S. firms will have a hard time using state courts to circumvent
the law. A foreign plaintiff in an extraterritorial suit will nearly al-
ways benefit from a federal anti-forum non conveniens statute be-
cause these suits will generally be brought in diversity and are subject
to removal to federal court at the election of either party.165
2. Jurisdiction to Prescribe and to Adjudicate'(
(a) Jurisdiction over U.S. firms operating in Mexico
(1) Jurisdiction to adjudicate environmental claims arising in Alex-
ico-U.S. courts determine the propriety of adjudicating a claim aris-
ing outside the country much as they would a claim arising outside the
forum. Constitutional due process, as enunciated in International
162. Neff, supra note 109, at 526.
163. Mexican courts would have to deal with a comparable language barrier because of
English speaking defendants.
164. Dow Chemical, 786 S.W.2d at 674-75.
165. See FLEmING JAzMS & GEoFFREY C. HAzARD, CMrvu PRoceDuRE §§ 2.2 2.5 (3rd
ed. 1985).
166. Prescriptive or legislative jurisdiction, the power to regulate a particular canduct
or activity, should be distinguished from adjudicatory jurisdiction, ,Ahich is the power to
assert jurisdiction over the party.
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Shoe Co. v. Washington 67 and its progeny, require that assertions of
jurisdiction be fair and reasonable to the defendant." Since jurisdic-
tion over a defendant corporation in its state of incorporation is al-
most always fair,169 jurisdiction over almost all U.S. corporations
exposed to extraterritorial claims will meet the requirements of due
process.
Generally this means that a corporation can be sued in several
places, almost always including the state of incorporation and, proba-
bly, its principal place of business. 17
0
(2) Power to legislate extraterritorially over U.S. firms in Mex-
ico-Congress has power to unilaterally legislate the environmental
conduct of U.S. firms operating abroad.171 International law, as codi-
fied in the Restatement of Foreign Relations, allows extraterritorial ju-
risdiction to prescribe (or legislate) under several theories. 172 The
principle of nationality will generally suffice as a basis of legislative
power over U.S. corporations. The jurisdiction is based on the alle-
giance of the citizen, the state's responsibility for its nationals, and the
state's interest in its citizens' welfare.173
Although international comity-voluntary respect for other sov-
ereign nations and the international legal order' 74-- has received con-
167. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
168. EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CoNFLIcr OF LAWS § 3.26 (1st ed. 1982) (citing
International Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1948) and its progeny.)
169. "A corporation which is organized and incorporated under the laws of a state has
always been assumed to be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of the state. In nearly
all situations that continues to be the case." ScoLES & HAY, supra note 168, § 9.2.
170. Id.
171. Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment
Due Process, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1217, 1218 (1992). See also Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2908-
11. Congressional intent determines the reach of U.S. extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction
to legislate over non-U.S. defendants. Id. Where jurisdiction to prescribe existed and con-
gressional intent did not bar considerations of international comity, the Court was unde-
cided as to whether cases could be dismissed because of comity. Id. at 2910.
172. RESTATEmENT (THnR) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402 (1986) ("Subject to section
403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to ... (2) the activities, interests,
status or relations of its nationals outside as well as within its territory.").
173. THOMAs BUERGENTHAL & HAROLD G. MAIER, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 163
(2d ed. 1990). A corporation has the nationality of the state that creates it, and there must
be a genuine link, which could be the nationality of the majority shareholder of the com-
pany. Id. at 165; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 213. For extension to
non-incorporated companies, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
§ 211(c).
174. "Comity refers to the spirit of cooperation in which a domestic tribunal ap-
proaches the resolution of cases touching the laws and interests of other sovereign states."
Societe National Industrielle Aerospatiale et al. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 481 U.S. 522, 544
(1987) (dealing with comity as related to the extraterritorial reach of U.S. discovery rules).
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sideration in the Restatement and in case law,175 Congress' intent to
apply law extraterritorially overrides all considerations of comity.
176
The role of comity in the U.S. law of extraterritorial jurisdiction is
apparently poorly defined and secondary to congressional intent.
1 "
Nonetheless, it has a potential judicial role. 78 The Restatement of
Foreign Relations section 403 takes into account norms of interna-
tional comity in its requirement that legislative power be exercised
reasonably. 179 However, even if comity is taken into account, applica-
175. See e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Say. Ass'n,
549 F.2d 597, 613-615 (9th Cir. 1976).
176. Developments in the Lan-International Environment Law, supra note 128, at
1630; Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 171, at 1217-18. Where jurisdiction to prescribe laws
exists and congressional intent does not bar considerations of international comity, the
Court has not decided whether cases could be dismissed because of comity. Hartford, 113
S. C. at 2910. Though not required by U.S. law, considerations of comity should play a
role in selecting which states law should apply to extraterritorial suits. See Harold G.
Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Pri-
vate International Law, 76 Am. J. IT'L L. 280, 281 (1982).
According to the RBsrAThmNT (SEcoND) OF CoN',ucr oF L,ws § 6 (1971), within
constitutional limits states should follow their own statutory directives on choice of law.
Where a state statute does not does clearly indicate which forum's law should apply to the
matter before the court, the Restatement suggests a series of factors to weigh in making
choice of law decisions. The factors reflect the interests of comity as well as other policies.
177. See generally Hartford, 113 S. Ct. 2891 (dealing with comity and extraterritorial
jurisdiction to prescribe over non-U.S. defendants).
178. See infra notes 185-199 and accompanying text. Although Hartford deals specifi-
cally with non-U.S. defendants, it is a logical conclusion that comity will be even less of a
consideration when defendants are U.S. corporations.
179. The Restatement says:
(1) Even when one of the bases for jurisdiction under section 402 is present, a
state may not exercise jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to a person or
activity having connections with another state when the exercise of such jurisdic-
tion is unreasonable.
(2) Whether exercise of jurisdiction over a person or activity is unreasonable is
determined by evaluating all relevant factors, including, where appropriate:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substan-
tial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the
activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regula-
tion is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regula-
tion to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such
activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is gen-
erally accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt
by the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
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tion of environmental law to U.S. firms operating in Mexico is
reasonable.180
(3) Jurisdiction over U.S. subsidiaries operating in Mexico-As-
serting adjudicative and prescriptive jurisdiction over foreign subsidi-
aries of U.S. parent companies involves the additional procedural step
of convincing the court to disregard the Mexican corporate entity.181
Although the law is not uniform from state to state, generally this
means showing that the subsidiary was "controlled" by the parent
company.la 2 This issue will doubtless be the subject of litigation.
1 83
(b) Jurisdiction over non-U.S. firms operating in Mexico
Unilateral extraterritorial jurisdiction over non-U.S. companies
operating in Mexico poses the most difficult legal and political
problems that this Note will address. The better alternative is a com-
panion document to NAFTA, providing that in exchange for duty-free
access to the markets of the developed north, Mexico will bolster its
environmental regulation of non-U.S. firms operating in Mexico. Def-
inite goals, a methodology to test when goals are reached, and a time-
line for completion will make the agreement more effective and more
palatable to Congress.
Extraterritorial jurisdiction over U.S. firms in Mexico will allow
Mexican regulators the luxury of concentrating their efforts on non-
U.S. firms. That lightened burden combined with increased revenues
from free trade should allow the Mexican government to bring envi-
ronmental regulation up to the standards of its trading partners. 1
4
However, if it does not, U.S.-based firms will likely suffer an unfair,
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity;
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state,
REsTATEmENT (THiRD) OF FoREIGN RELATiONS § 403.
180. The jurisdiction is reasonable mainly because the regulated parties are U.S. nation-
als with profound economic and territorial links to the U.S. See id. § 403(2)(b). Further-
more, the U.S. economic community has legitimate expectations that in exchange for duty.
free access to U.S. markets, Mexico-based U.S. firms will not compete on the basis of lower
environmental costs. See id. § 403(2)(c) & (d).
181. For a more complete analysis, see Basurto & Flud, supra note 54, at 682-90.
182. Id. at 684.
183. See Johnson v. Abbe Engineering Co., 749 F.2d 1131 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding par-
ent company liable for tort to employees of subsidiary where parent company was respon-
sible to review the subsidiary's safety practices).
184. For the idea that Mexico should live up to promised strict environmental regula-
tion, see Lissakers, supra note 24.
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perhaps severe, competitive disadvantage. If that happens, the United
States will need to address the regulatory disparities in order to avoid
either abandoning the trade agreement or allowing U.S. firms in Mex-
ico to operate according to a standard of environmental regulation
found in developing countries.
(1) A problematic solution: the effects doctrine-One solution
would be to extend jurisdiction a step further, to the non-U.S. compa-
nies operating in Mexico. If necessary, the United States can amend
the earlier contemplated extraterritorial legislation to apply environ-
mental regulation to non-U.S. firms operating in Mexico. Though
permissible under U.S. case law, this type of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion is right on the edge of the legislative jurisdiction allowed by the
more cautious Restatement of Foreign Relations.1 5 The Restatement's
grant of extraterritorial jurisdiction is already considered excessive by
some.1
86
(2) Jurisdiction to legislate or adjudicate-Nonetheless, the Mexi-
can operations of these non-U.S. firms can be regulated by unilateral
legislation analogous to U.S. antitrust law with prescriptive power
based on the "effects" doctrine." 7 Under the effects doctrine, as
stated by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, "any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not
within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has conse-
quences within its borders which the state reprehends; and these lia-
bilities other states will ordinarily recognize."' ' 18 For purposes of
extraterritorial environmental legislation, jurisdiction can arguably be
based on the polluting firms' economic effects on U.S. commerce.
Congressional intent and constitutional due process determine
whether a specific law can be extraterritorially applied to non-U.S.
firms operating in Mexico. 189 Absent contrary intent, there is a pre-
185. See RESTATEmNT (THnu) oF FoREIaN RELAIONS § 403.
186. "The application of antitrust and securities laws, on both governmental and private
initiative, has reached beyond the territorial frontiers of the United States, and from time
to time has been perceived by other states as intrusions into their rightful domain." RE.
STATE~mNT (Tnnr) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS pt. IV, ch. 1, subch. A, introductory note.
187. Id. § 402(1)(c) ("Subject to § 403, a state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with
respect to ... (1)(c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have substantial
effects within its territory.").
188. 148 F.2d 416,443 (2d Cir. 1945) [hereinafter Alcoa]. Jurisdiction by objective terri-
toriality (the effects doctrine) is allowed where there is an effect within the territory of the
state asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction. BUERGENTHAL & MNE, supra note 173, at
168.
189. See U.S. v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245,248 (9th Cir. 1989). In determining an extraterrito-
rial violation of antitrust law, "[t]he answer does not depend upon %hether we shall recog-
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sumption that laws apply only within U.S. territory.19° However, ac-
cording to Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, congressional
intent is sufficient to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction to prescribe
acts of non-U.S. defendants. 191 Justice Scalia, dissenting on other
grounds, agreed that clear congressional intent to prescribe super-
sedes considerations of international comity.
192
Furthermore, according to Hartford, Congress can decide
whether courts should consider comity when applying extraterritorial
statutes. 93 However, Hartford does not answer whether courts can
consider comity as a basis for declining legislative jurisdiction absent
nize as a source of liability a liability imposed by another state. On the contrary we are
concerned only with whether Congress chose to attach liability to the conduct outside the
U.S. of persons not in allegiance to it. That being so, the only question open is whether
Congress intended to impose the liability, and whether our own Constitution permitted it
to do so: as a court of the United States, we cannot look beyond our own law." Alcoa, 148
F.2d at 443. However, Judge Hand goes on to indicate that some comity-like principles
have a role in determining the reach of U.S. law. "Nevertheless, it is quite true that we are
not to read general words, such as those in this Act, without regard to the limitations
customarily observed by nations upon the exercise of their powers; limitations which gen-
erally correspond to those fixed by the 'Conflict of Laws.' We should not impute to Con-
gress an intent to punish all whom its courts can catch, for conduct which has no
consequences within the United States." Id.
190. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. 1227, 1230 (1991).
191. See Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2910. In dicta, the court indicated that "concerns of
comity come into play, if at all, only after a court has determined that the acts complained
of are subject to Sherman Act jurisdiction." Id. at 2910 n.24 (emphasis added). In Hart-
ford, the defendants, London insurance companies, engaged in alleged anticompetitive
practices, argued that in appropriate circumstances the interests of another sovereign state
require that U.S. courts restrict U.S. extraterritorial jurisdiction to legislate. Id at 2909.
The Court disagreed. Id. at 2910.
In the past, some courts held that comity as well as "effect" must be considered when
determining whether jurisdiction by objective territoriality is properly asserted. 40 A.L.R.
Fed. 343, § 3(c) (1992). See, e.g., 7imberlane Lumber, 549 F.2d at 612-15.
192. See Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2919. "Though it clearly has authority to do so, Con-
gress is generally presumed not to have exceeded those customary international-law limits
on jurisdiction to prescribe." Id. Scalia urges some consideration of comity. Id. Joined by
three other Justices, he writes that not only is clear legislative intent required for extraterri-
torial assertions of jurisdiction, but "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to
violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains." Id. at 2918-19 (quot-
ing Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (Marshall, C.J.)).
The question of whether or not there should be an exception to comity, as reflecting a
norm of customary international law, in order to remedy an environmental competitive
imbalance between trading partners is beyond the scope of this Note. For our purposes, it
is sufficient to note that Congress has the power to legislate as well as the mandate to
decide whether it is wise to do so.
193. "Congress expressed no view on the question whether a court with Sherman Act
jurisdiction should ever decline to exercise such jurisdiction on grounds of international
comity .... We need not decide that question here, however, for even assuming that in a
proper case a court may decline to exercise Sherman Act jurisdiction over foreign conduct,
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congressional direction.194 Thus, if Congress legislates extraterritori-
ally without specifically addressing the issue of comity, courts may
seize upon the lack of direction in Hartford and use comity to make ad
hoe dismissals of jurisdiction. 95 If courts engage in comity analysis
under the pattern provided by the Restatement of Foreign Relations,
jurisdiction over non-U.S. firms in Mexico will probably be
dismissed.19
Yet, a vote against judicial consideration of comity does not mean
that foreign policy considerations are abandoned. Rather, issues of
sovereignty will be decided by Congress as it considers extraterritorial
legislation for this whole category of conduct in Mexico.197
The effects doctrine is also available as a basis for jurisdiction to
adjudicate. 198 Jurisdiction to adjudicate on the basis of effects is es-
sentially a due process, minimum contacts analysis.199 The Restate-
... international comity would not counsel against exercising jurisdiction in the circum-
stances alleged here. " Hartford, 113 S. Ct. at 2910.
194. Id. Note that, according to Hartford, absent contrary intent, a sovereign compul-
sion analysis is appropriate to determine whether jurisdiction should be refused because of
"a true conflict between domestic and foreign law." Id. at 2910 (quoting Nationale Indus-
trielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 555 (1987) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part)). That is, no conflict exists where the defendant
can comply with the law of both countries. Id. at 2910-11.
195. See id. at 2910.
196. See REsTATEmENT (Ttmu) oF FoRmEN Rr.AxoNs § 403. Various factors of
§ 403 weigh against reasonableness. Most significantly, the activity has an arguably indi-
rect rather than a "direct" effect upon U.S. commerce. See id. at § 403(2)(a). The activity
to be regulated, pollution in Mexico, indirectly affects U.S. commerce by allowing non-U.S.
firms operating in Mexico an unfair competitive advantage. The intermediate effect is that
companies which externalize environmental costs, all other facts being equal, enjoy lower
operating costs. Compare environmental assertions to antitrust law. Antitrust law regu-
lates conduct that has a direct impact on the U.S. economy, namely conspiring to fix the
prices of goods sold within the U.S. See Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.
197. The Department of Justice, Antitrust Division makes an analogous argument.
They argue that antitrust actions should not be subject to dismissal on the basis of comity
because the U.S. government considers the interest of foreign sovereigns vis- -vis U.S.
interests when it decides to prosecute extraterritorial violations. Antitrust Guidelines for
International Operations, 53 Fed. Reg. 21, 584 n.112 (1988).
198. "In general, a state's exercise of jurisdiction to adjudicate with respect to a person
or thing is reasonable if, at the time jurisdiction is asserted:. ... (j) the person, whether
natural or juridical, had carried on outside the state an activity having a substantial, direct,
and foreseeable effect within the state, but only in respect of such activity."
RESTATEmNT (Trmp) oF FOIGN RELA nOs § 421(2)(j). This jurisdiction is limited to
disputes arising from the effects upon the forum state.
199. Federal Trade Commission v. Compagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636
F.2d 1300, 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1980); REsTATEmEN (SECO.D) OF CoN'acr OF L&,ws § 37,
cmts. c-d, Reporter's Note (1988).
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ment also indicates that the court's authority to adjudicate under this
principle must be statutory.2°°
3. Foreign and Domestic Considerations for Statutory
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
As reflected in judicial considerations of comity, there are many
reasons to be cautious about asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction over
pollution in Mexico. A comprehensive outline of the likely political
debate over extraterritorial jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this
Note and is an inherently speculative exercise. However, it is appro-
priate to touch on two issues likely to be central to the debate.
The toughest obstacle to extraterritorial jurisdiction is the argu-
ment that it infringes upon the sovereign power of the plaintiff's na-
tion to decide controversies arising on its own territory.20 1 The effects
doctrine has raised controversy as a basis of U.S. antitrust regula-
tion.2°2 The United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, the Republic of the
Philippines, Japan, and Korea are some of the countries that have leg-
islation aimed at frustrating U.S. assertions of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion.203 The legislation can work both directly and indirectly, often
blocking discovery or the enforcement of judgments.20 4 Furthermore,
Mexico has more reasons than most countries to distrust U.S. extra-
200. Effects were not recognized at common law as a basis of judicial jurisdiction. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFICTS OF LAWS § 37, cmt. f.
201. Disputes arising in Mexico should be decided by Mexican law. Burguete-Stanek
Interview, supra note 57.
202. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403(2)(c). Many nations
disagree with extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction. In Britain, F.A. Mann, a leading
international lawyer, soundly rejected the Restatement of Foreign Relations § 403's edict
that extraterritorial jurisdiction can be determined on a reasonableness basis. Mark W.
Janis, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 259 (1988) (citing Mann, The Doctrine
of International Jurisdiction Revisited, 186 HAouE REcuBIL 9,20 (1984)). Mann, like Brit-
ish law and lawyers, generally believes that sovereignty is fundamentally territorial in na-
ture and distrusts the extraterritorial assertions of the United States. Id. See also James P.
Cargas, Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the Proposed Federal Waste Export Control
Act, 7 AM. U. J. INT'L & PoCy 397, 415 (1992).
See also RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 402, cmt. d. For a look at
the rough welcome extraterritorial application of American antitrust legislation has re-
ceived, see Joseph P. Griffin, The Impact on Canada of the Extraterritorial Application of
the U.S. Antitrust Laws, 57 ANTITRUST LJ. 435 (1988). Cf. Neff, supra note 109, at 500-01.
Critics call the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act "cultural imperialism."
203. Seung Wha Chang, Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws to Other
Pacific Countries: Proposed Bilateral Agreements for Resolving International Conflicts
Within the Pacific Community, 16 HAST. INT'L AND Comp. L. REv. 295, 298-303 (1993).
204. Id.
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territorial assertions of power; the U.S. has a long history of self-inter-
ested interventions in Mexico3 °5
The next most important political issue is the likely opposition
from U.S.-based multinationals who would be subjected to the added
expense of environmental regulation. For example, during the negoti-
ations for NAFTA side agreements, business lobbying groups such as
USA*NAFTA balked at proposals for trade sanctions to enforce envi-
ronmental and labor regulations, proposals much less decisive than
extraterritorial jurisdiction.206 Among other things, the groups ob-
jected to giving officials charged with overseeing regulatory enforce-
ment "broad powers to direct and 'second guess' the actions of
national and subnational enforcement authorities as well as to launch
investigations" into public and private parties. 0 7
With respect to U.S. firms, complaints of invaded sovereignty can
be substantially appeased because the polluting companies and the
funds to pay judgments would be in the U.S. and, in many instances, at
least part of the plans and safety measures (or lack thereof) that
caused harm in Mexico will have originated in the U.S. Furthermore,
the direct effects of extraterritorial jurisdiction in Mexico would be
limited to on-site investigation, requesting of evidence, and the sub-
poena of witnesses.20 Finally, extraterritorial jurisdiction, as recom-
mended in this Note, would not interfere with Mexican law. Rather,
the systems would be parallel. A qualifying plaintiff would be free to
sue under existing Mexican law or to use the U.S. system.
205. MICHAEL C. M3EYE & WnitAm L SHERmAN, Tim CouP.sE oF ME-XcAN His-
TORY 335-54 (regarding the Mexican-American War, the annexation of Texas and Califor-
nia, and the national humiliation of Mexico by U.S. actions), 531-33 (regarding the U.S.
intervention of 1914), 541-42 (regarding U.S. General John Pershing's expeditions into
Mexico to catch Pancho Villa) (4th ed. 1991). Consider the recent uproar over the U.S.
Supreme Court's assent to the capture in Mexico and return to the U.S. of a Mexican
citizen, who allegedly assisted in the torture of U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)
agent Enrique Camarena. Latin America; Ready For Partnership? FoRmEGN AFFA Rs 74,
82 (1992).
Humberto Alvarez Machain, the Guadalajara gynecologist accused of drugging
Camarena, was delivered by Mexican police to U.S. authorities in exchange for S50,O00.
Lou Cannon, Two Camarena Defendants Go On Trial, WAsH. PosT, Dec. 3,1992, at A3.
When Mexico asked that Alvarez be returned, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the abduc-
tion 6-3. Id. The Mexican government later denounced the trial on grounds that their
citizen was "kidnapped on Mexican territory in flagrant violation of international law." Id.
206. Business Groups Warn Kantor That Draft Texts Are Flawed, BNA I'&L EW..
DAnY, June 10, 1993.
207. Id.
208. The question of international collection of evidence has its own body of law. For
an overview, see ScoL-s & HAY, supra note 168, §§ 12.8 to 12.14.
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On the other hand, asserting jurisdiction over non-U.S. firms
presents the problem of a stronger appearance of invaded sovereignty.
In order to establish unilateral jurisdiction over non-U.S. firms operat-
ing in Mexico, an important selling point would be Mexico's commit-
ment to enforce its environmental laws.2°9 Thus, if Mexico defaults on
its commitment of effective environmental regulation, the U.S. would
have an estoppel-like justification for extraterritorial jurisdiction. If
such a situation should occur, there may be a need for unilateral meas-
ures to enforce environmental regulation. Use of the effects doctrine
is such a unilateral option, one with strong chances of effectively regu-
lating the environmental practices of all firms producing goods that
substantially affect the U.S. economy.
4. Choice of Law
Federal or state statutes can easily resolve choice of law issues by
directing that environmental laws are to be applied to U.S. firms oper-
ating in Mexico or to non-U.S. firms operating in Mexico. 210 Thus,
where a statute has clear extraterritorial intent, choice of law will not
select foreign law.21'
Constitutional limits on choice of law are fairly light. The outer
limits of state choice of law doctrine stem from the Due Process
Clause of the Foruteenth Amendment.212 Federal courts and Con-
209. Mexico's opposition to such a commitment, in contravention of what the country
has already promised, Lissakers, supra note 24, could scuttle NAFIA in Congress. Consid-
ering Salinas' zeal to see NAFTA succeed, Mexico is probably unwilling to take that risk.
See Ratification a Priority, supra note 22.
210. Where the statute applies to private civil actions, it should mandate damages pur-
suant to U.S. law; thus, U.S. companies operating in Mexico will be at risk of liability
equivalent to that borne by companies operating in the United States. As we have seen, if
choice of law includes Mexico's severe caps on damages or other impediments to suits,
most Mexican plaintiffs will have no legal recourse in U.S. courts. See supra notes 58-64
and accompanying text on Mexican environmental law, detailing how most damages are
limited to lost wages. Since maquiladora workers earn an average of $1.73 an hour and
the average Mexican worker earns $2.17 an hour, Lissakers, supra note 24, it would be
nearly impossible to justify the expense of U.S. court action. But see Boehringer, supra
note 148, at 67 (arguing that damages should be controlled by the law of the plaintiff's
domicile to allow developing countries to control disincentives to foreign investment).
211. Regarding Federal law, see EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. at 1236;
Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 171, at 1218-19. For state law, see Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345
U.S. 571, n.7 (1953) (Jackson, J.).
212. Scor.n-s & HAY, supra note 168, § 3.21. The leading Fourteenth Amendment case
is Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), where the Court denied Texas jurisdiction
over a claim arising in Mexico and proscribed the application of forum law where a defend-
ant lacked significant "contacts" with the forum state. ScoaLEs & HAY, supra, § 3.21. In
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302,313 (1981), the Court held that for a state to assert
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gress are also subject to constitutional limits on extraterritorial choice
of law from the identically worded Fifth amendment Due Process
Clause. 1 3 However, due process arguments have never invalidated
application of federal law."' 4
An additional purpose of the statute(s) would be to avoid the
confusion and inconsistent judgments resulting from state choice of
law rules2 15 State choice of law rules are complex 1 6 They not only
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction but among causes of action? 1
7
Application of the rules is uncertain and rarely produces consistent
results?"' Without statutory intent to guide the way, choice of law for
extraterritorial environmental torts219 can follow one of three distinct
approaches: (1) apply the law of the forum where the tort occurred;.20
(2) weigh the interests of the nations involved using factors such as
those suggested in the Restatement of Conflicts; 1 or (3) rarely, the
its laws over a controversy in a constitutionally permissible manner, the state must have
contacts or an accumulation of contacts such that "choice of law is neither arbitrary nor
fundamentally unfair." ScoL.ns & HAY, supra, § 3.23. The Hague opinion suggests that
even the most minimal contacts with the forum state can justify the use of the ler fori.
Scoles and Hay criticize the Hague decision, suggesting that there should be a test to guide
the courts in making these choice of law decisions. ScoLEs & HAY, supra, §§ 326 to 327.
The public policy exception to the territorially based choice of law rules allows for dismis-
sal of a suit where application of foreign law is due and the foreign law to be applied is
sufficiently offensive to the public policy interest of the forum. ScoL.Es & HAY, supra,
§§ 3.16 to 3.17. However, if the foreign law is offensive and the forum has a relationship to
the issue and parties, U.S. courts choose the lefori based on public policy considerations.
Id.
213. U.S. v. Davis, 905 F.2d at 248.
214. Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 171, at 1219. The authors suggest that due process
can be a successful defense in state international choice of law cases because federal courts
are wont to rein in the state judge's tendency to be more aggressive than federal courts in
asserting jurisdiction of claims with facts arising abroad. Id. at 1230.
215. Choice of law rulings are best read with skepticism since it seems, at least on occa-
sion, that judges determine which law they would like to apply and then more or less
invent a rationale to apply their preferred rule. ScoL.Fs & HAY, supra note 16-, § 17.1.
216. Choice of law rules vary from state to state and are drawn mainly from common
law. Choice of law rules tend to be complex, hard to analyze and apply. See DAVItD D.
SiEGEL, CONFCICTS IN A NUTsHELL § 55 (1992).
217. Developments in the Law-International Environment Law, supra note 128, at
1625.
218. See SIEGEL, supra note 216, § 55. Parties in diversity are in the same quagmire
since federal choice of law rules, as enunciated in Erie LR. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938), dictate that state substantive law and federal procedural law should be followed.
SEEGEL, supra, § 5.
219. Generally, environmental causes of action fall under the choice of law rules for
torts. Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, supra note 125, at
1625.
220. See ScoL.ns & HAY, supra note 168, §§ 17.2 to 17.10.
221. Id. §§ 17.11 to 17.17; §§ 17.21 to 17.25.
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court may simply determine what is sound policy and apply the "bet-
ter law" to reach that policy.222
IV. CONCLUSION
Amid all the criticism it is easy to forget that NAFTA is a docu-
ment of potentially immense economic value.22' But free trade can-
not be blindly embraced. The United States must consider fairness to
domestic industry, to U.S. citizens on the border, to U.S. foreign pol-
icy, and to the citizens and the environment of Mexico. Unfortu-
nately, it is not reasonable to expect strict environmental enforcement
from Mexico. Mexican regulators are unable to keep up with their
current regulatory load, never mind the influx of trade and investment
anticipated if NAFTA is passed. 2 4
Thus, extraterritorial assertions should be viewed as temporary
measures specifically reflecting the disparities between the trading
partners. When the wealth of increased trade and the experience of
Mexico's still novice environmental regulators allows, SEDUE, or its
progeny, should take over the lead and eventual total control of regu-
lation in Mexico. In the meantime, extraterritorial jurisdiction is a so-
lution with relatively easy application and excellent chances of
effectively securing U.S. interests related to environmental control.
222. Developments in the Law-International Environmental Law, supra note 128, at
1625-26. See also ScoLs & HAY, supra note 168, §§ 17.18 to 17.20.
223. In addition to the economic benefits to the three countries, a successful NAFTA
may solve one of the great economic quandaries of the twentieth century: how to usher
cash-poor developing countries into the industrialized world when the industrialized world
continues to outpace them.
224. Mexican officials may believe their country cannot afford strict environmental pro-
tection because it is an obstacle to economic growth. Cf. Richard B. Bilder, The Role of
Unilateral State Action in Preventing International Environmental Injury, 14 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 51, 86 (1981). "Some states may find it profitable to become pollution
havens." Id. at 86.
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